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NFL 3-0 IN FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT CHALLENGES TO
PLAYER SUSPENSIONS: A PATTERN OF “SUBSTANTIAL
DEFERENCE” TO THE NFL CREATES AN
UPHILL BATTLE FOR PLAYERS
I. INTRODUCTION
As the most popular professional sports league in America, the
National Football League (“NFL,” or “the League”) is known for its
star athletes and highly anticipated game days.1 However, a recent
set of cases illustrates a new form of competition within the League,
one in which players compete against the NFL itself in off-field legal
battles.2 The cases have involved star players, including former
Minnesota Vikings and Arizona Cardinals running back Adrian Peterson (“Peterson”), and New England Patriots quarterback Tom
Brady (“Brady”), much like an actual NFL game.3 The cases have
also attracted the attention of the media and fans.4 Peterson and
Brady each sued the League in federal court to dispute the discipline the League imposed on them after it determined the players
1. See Christopher R. Deubert et al., Comparing Health-Related Policies and Practices in Sports: The NFL and Other Professional Leagues, 8 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1,
17 (2017) (noting NFL is highest-grossing professional sports league in United
States).
2. For a discussion of the lawsuits filed against the NFL by Adrian Peterson,
Tom Brady and Ezekiel Elliott, see infra notes 54–91, 92–128, and 129–169,
respectively.
3. For further discussion of the Peterson and Brady cases, see infra notes
54–128 and accompanying text; see also John Keim, Adrian Peterson Signs Deal With
Redskins, ESPN (Aug. 21, 2018), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/24427263/
adrian-peterson-signs-contract-washington-redskins [https://perma.cc/8HL97BVR] (noting that Peterson now plays running back for Washington Redskins).
4. See Ken Belson, N.F.L. Sued By Players Union Over Adrian Peterson Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/sports/football/
nfl-sued-by-players-union-over-adrian-peterson-ruling.html [https://perma.cc/
7KKV-L829] (commenting on Peterson’s lawsuit against NFL); see also Adam Kilgore, Details of Tom Brady’s Potential Lawsuit Against NFL; Patriots QB Could Possibly
Start Week 1, WASH. POST (July 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
sports/wp/2015/07/15/details-of-tom-bradys-potential-lawsuit-against-nfl-patriotsqb-could-possibly-start-week-1/?utm_term=.cfc0d5ea1c9f [https://perma.cc/
GZ3Z-3P9F] (providing details of Brady’s lawsuit); see also Ben Volin, Tom Brady
Officially Files Suit Against the NFL, BOS. GLOBE (July 30, 2015), https://www.boston
globe.com/sports/2015/07/29/tom-brady-files-lawsuit-against-nfl/h8xeRXAKRSWx93RCnAFk2L/story.html [https://perma.cc/9N6R-SG3W] (discussing
Brady’s lawsuit against NFL).
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had violated one of the NFL’s policies.5 In both cases, the players
prevailed in district court, only to be defeated on appeal by the
NFL.6
Dallas Cowboys’ running back Ezekiel Elliott (“Elliott”) was the
most recent player to challenge a League-imposed suspension in
federal court, and Peterson and Brady set the stage for this litigation.7 Elliott filed suit against the NFL in September 2017.8 Like
Peterson and Brady, Elliott was successful in district court, securing
an injunction against the NFL to prevent his suspension from taking effect.9 However, the NFL continued its winning streak at the
appellate level, and Elliott’s case met the same fate as the Peterson
and Brady cases when the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court.10
The Elliott case is significant for several reasons.11 In the context of the Peterson and Brady cases, the Elliott case demonstrates a
pattern of federal appellate courts reinstating League discipline
and reversing district court decisions favoring NFL players.12 This
pattern suggests that federal appellate courts exhibit substantial
deference to the NFL when they review League-issued arbitration
awards and that, as a result, the NFL will ultimately prevail in suits
5. See NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1089 (D. Minn. 2015)
[hereinafter Peterson I] rev’d and remanded sub nom. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Peterson II] (noting NFL
Players’ Association filed petition on behalf of Peterson to vacate arbitration award
upholding League-imposed punishment against Peterson); see also NFL Mgmt.
Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) [hereinafter NFL Mgmt. Council I], rev’d, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter NFL Mgmt.
Council II] (describing NFLPA’s lawsuit against NFL on behalf of Brady).
6. See Peterson II, 831 F.3d at 993–99 (providing Eighth Circuit’s holding in
favor of NFL); see also NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 532 (reversing district
court’s decision to vacate arbitration award on grounds that “the Commissioner
properly exercised his broad discretion to resolve an intramural controversy between the League and a player”).
7. See Michael McCann, Ezekiel Elliott Sues the NFL: What it Means For the League’s
Suspension of the Cowboys RB, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.si.
com/nfl/2017/09/01/ezekiel-elliott-suspension-sues-nfl-nflpa-lead-investigator-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/WT4T-96CE] (discussing Elliott’s suit against
NFL following League-imposed suspension).
8. See generally NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 270 F. Supp. 3d 939 (E.D. Tex. Sept.
8, 2017) [hereinafter Elliott I], vacated and remanded, 874 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2017)
[hereinafter Elliott II] (noting NFLPA sued NFL on behalf of Elliott seeking vacatur of arbitrator’s impending decision).
9. See id. at *1 (enjoining NFL’s suspension of Elliott).
10. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 225 (remanding case with instructions to dismiss).
11. See id. at 224–236 (offering details of Elliott case in Fifth Circuit).
12. See Peterson II, 831 F.3d at 993–99 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding in favor of
NFL); see also NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 2016) (reversing
district court’s decision to vacate arbitration award and finding in favor of NFL).
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filed by NFL players to challenge the arbitration process.13 The
case also involves an analysis of federal arbitration law, with the
Fifth Circuit delivering an outcome that transcends sports and will
likely impact future labor disputes.14
The Elliott case is also significant because it illustrates the
power of the NFL over its players, and the extent to which the NFL
derives its power from the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA,”
or “the Agreement”) between the National Football League Management Council (“NFLMC”) and the National Football League
Players Association (“NFLPA”).15 The CBA governs each NFL
player’s relationship with the League.16 The Agreement is the
product of negotiation between the NFLMC, which is led by the
League Commissioner and represents the NFL teams in the collective bargaining process, and the NFLPA, which represents the NFL
players.17 However, the Elliott case shows that the CBA significantly
favors the League, to the disadvantage of players.18 Therefore, the
case carries the potential to influence the terms of the new CBA,
which will take effect in 2021.19
This Casenote argues that federal appellate courts show substantial deference to the NFL when they review the decisions of
League arbitrators and that, as a result, the NFL will always prevail
over players who challenge the arbitration process.20 In Part II, this
Casenote discusses the CBA, including its role in the Elliott case
13. See Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1089 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d and remanded
sub nom. Peterson II, 831 F.3d 985 (quoting Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, Local No. 53, 751 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 2014)) (providing that
federal courts afford “substantial deference” to arbitration awards).
14. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 225–29 (vacating district court’s preliminary injunction against League).
15. See generally COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 NFL CBA], available at https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR9E-ZW2C]
(stating terms of agreement between NFL clubs and NFL players).
16. See id. (providing terms of agreement between NFL and its players).
17. See Daniel R. Peterson & Michael J. Redding, Third and Long: The Issues
Facing the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Negotiations and the Effects of an Uncapped Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95, 96–97 (2009) (providing background information on CBA, including parties and terms).
18. See id. (analyzing current NFL CBA); see also Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 225 (ruling in favor of NFL).
19. See Matt Bonesteel, NFL Players’ Union Leader Says 2021 Labor War ‘Is Almost
a Virtual Certainty’, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/08/18/nfl-players-union-leader-says-2021-laborwar-is-almost-a-virtual-certainty/?utm_term=.dbd8259f8931 [https://perma.cc/
5P3C-QDS7] (noting current NFL CBA expires in 2021).
20. For further discussion of the standard of review in federal arbitration
cases, see infra notes 42–53 and accompanying text.
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and the key provisions that impacted the Fifth Circuit’s analysis.21
Part II also includes a summary of the legal principles that established the Fifth Circuit majority’s standard of review.22 Additionally, Part II analyzes the Peterson and Brady cases as the precursors
to the Elliott case.23 Part III of this Casenote reviews the facts of the
Elliott case.24 Part IV provides an overview of the Fifth Circuit majority’s decision, as well as an overview of Judge Graves’s dissenting
opinion.25 Part V critiques the court’s analysis, including its approach to the significance of the CBA, and its application of prior
Fifth Circuit cases.26 Finally, Part VI explores the potential impact
of the Elliott case on future labor disputes, as well as its impact on
the NFL and its players.27
II.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S PLAYBOOK: THE CBA, THE STANDARD
REVIEW, AND THE PETERSON AND BRADY CASES

OF

A. The CBA
When an NFL player challenges League-imposed discipline in
court, the CBA plays a lead role in the court’s resolution of the
matter.28 The Elliott case aptly illustrates this reliance on the current CBA.29 The CBA laid the groundwork for the entire dispute,
including the initial investigation and hearing by NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell (“the Commissioner,” “Goodell,” or “Commissioner Goodell”), as well as the procedure permitting Elliott to
appeal the discipline imposed by the Commissioner and commence
21. For a discussion of the relevant portions of the CBA between the NFL and
its players, as well as the role of the Agreement in the Fifth Circuit’s resolution of
the Elliott case, see infra notes 29–41 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the standard of review applied by the Fifth Circuit
majority, see infra notes 42–52 and accompanying text.
23. For an analysis of the Peterson and Brady cases, see infra notes 54–91 and
92–128, respectively, and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the facts of the Elliott case, see infra notes 129–169 and
accompanying text.
25. For an analysis of the Fifth Circuit majority’s opinion in the Elliott case,
see infra notes 170–208 and accompanying text. For an analysis of Judge Graves’s
dissenting opinion, see infra notes 209–241.
26. For a critique of the Fifth Circuit’s holding, see infra notes 242–292.
27. For a discussion of the potential impact of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in
the Elliott case, see infra notes 296–324 and accompanying text.
28. See 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46 (outlining NFL protocols for “Commissioner
Discipline”).
29. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 229 (holding that each NFL player is “required to
exhaust his contractual remedies before filing his lawsuit”).
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arbitration.30 The CBA also served as the foundation for the matter
once it reached court, steering the Fifth Circuit’s analysis.31
The CBA is the product of negotiation between the NFLMC,
which is led by the League Commissioner and represents the NFL
teams in the collective bargaining process, and the NFLPA, which
represents the NFL players.32 Article 46 is the most pertinent section of the CBA in the context of the Elliott case.33 It permits the
Commissioner to impose discipline on players for “conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game.”34
Article 46 also allows a player to appeal the Commissioner’s disciplinary decision to a hearing officer appointed by the Commissioner.35 Notably, Article 46 permits the “Commissioner or his
designee” to serve as hearing officers in an arbitration
proceeding.36
Each player also signs a contract, which is part of the CBA.37
The contract states that, upon a finding of conduct detrimental to
the League, the Commissioner “will have the right, but only after
giving Player the opportunity for a hearing . . . to fine Player in a
reasonable amount; to suspend Player for a period certain or indefinitely; and/or to terminate this contract.”38 The NFL also has a
Personal Conduct Policy (“PCP”), which is part of the CBA and de-

30. See 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46 (detailing procedures through which Commissioner may investigate player conduct and impose discipline, and through which
player may pursue arbitration to appeal Commissioner’s decision).
31. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d 222, 232–36 (discussing pertinent sections of CBA
and role of CBA as binding contract between parties).
32. See Peterson & Redding, supra note 17, at 96–97 (naming parties to CBA).
33. See 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46 (outlining NFL protocols for “Commissioner
Discipline,” including hearings and penalties).
34. See id. at § 1(a) (detailing aspects of “League Discipline”).
35. See id. at §§ 1(a), 2(a) (outlining procedure for player appeals).
36. Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1088 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d and remanded
sub nom. Peterson II, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting language from CBA); see
also 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46 (providing that Commissioner may act as arbitrator in
proceeding between League and player).
37. See 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 4 (stating that NFL teams and NFL players agree
to amend NFL Player Contract contained in CBA); NFL Player Contract, SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N, available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1573683/
000104746913009713/a2216998zex-10_3.htm (last accessed Jan. 7, 2019) [https://
perma.cc/PS74-6CJD] (providing terms of standard contract for NFL player); see
also Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1086 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Peterson II, 831 F.3d 985 (discussing terms of players’ contracts with NFL).
38. See 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46 (discussing scope of Commissioner’s ability to
discipline players).
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termines what constitutes conduct detrimental to the League and
the discipline that may follow.39
The Elliott case shows that the CBA favors the NFL, and that
courts are unwilling to depart from the CBA when resolving disputes between NFL players and the League.40 Thus, the case raises
the possibility that players will demand more favorable arbitration
terms during the collective bargaining process for the 2021
agreement.41
B. Federal Arbitration Law as the Standard of Review
The Peterson, Brady, and Elliott cases originated in the realm
of sports, but they required each court to analyze federal arbitration law.42 Each player filed his lawsuit only after he participated in
mandatory arbitration proceedings with the NFL.43 The principles
of federal arbitration law in each case establish the judicial standard
of review of an arbitrator’s award and highlight the uphill battle
that NFL players face when they challenge a League-imposed arbitration award in court.44
39. See Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 989 (acknowledging applicability of NFL
PCP to case).
40. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d 222, 232–36 (5th Cir. 2017) (discussing significance
of CBA in resolution of case and delivering holding in favor of NFL and reversing
district court’s decision to grant petition by NFLPA and Elliott to vacate arbitration
award).
41. See Kevin Seifert, DeMaurice Smith: NFLPA Will Approach 2021 Talks Like
‘War’, ESPN (Feb. 2, 2018), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/22291292/
demaurice-smith-nflpa-approach-2021-cba-talks-war [https://perma.cc/KB5XR3Q5] (stating NFL “[p]layers plan to pursue changes” to current CBA when it
expires in 2021).
42. See Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1089 (analyzing federal arbitration law as
result of petition filed by NFLPA on behalf of Peterson to vacate arbitration award
upholding League-imposed punishment against Peterson); see also NFL Mgmt.
Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820
F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016) (analyzing federal arbitration law in context of NFLPA’s
lawsuit against NFL on behalf of Brady); see also generally Elliott I, 270 F. Supp. 3d
939 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2017), vacated and remanded, Elliott II, 874 F.3d 222 (analyzing federal arbitration law in context of NFLPA’s lawsuit on behalf of Elliott to
challenge arbitrator’s decision to uphold League-imposed suspension of Elliott).
43. See 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 15 (requiring players to engage in arbitration with
NFL if players appeal League-imposed discipline).
44. See Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1089 (analyzing federal arbitration law as
result of petition filed by NFLPA on behalf of Peterson to vacate arbitration award
upholding League-imposed punishment against Peterson); see also NFL Mgmt.
Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 452 (analyzing federal arbitration law in context of
NFLPA’s lawsuit against NFL on behalf of Brady); see also Elliott I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at
947–48 (analyzing federal arbitration law in context of NFLPA’s lawsuit on behalf
of Elliott to challenge arbitrator’s decision to uphold League-imposed suspension
of Elliott).
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As the district court stated in the Peterson case, “[c]ourts give
decisions by labor arbitrators ‘substantial deference.’”45 In other
words, “‘[a]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the [CBA] and acting within the scope of his authority,
that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.’”46 However, the arbitrator’s authority does not go completely unchecked by a reviewing court.47 “The
court must vacate the award if it fails to ‘draw its essence from the
agreement,’ such that the arbitrator imposed ‘his own brand of industrial injustice.’”48 An arbitration award may also be vacated
when the arbitrator “‘exceed[ed] the authority given to him by the
CBA or decided matters parties have not submitted to him.’”49
The findings of the district court in each case illustrate the potential relief that these avenues for judicial intervention offer to an
NFL player who brings a lawsuit to challenge the unfavorable award
of a League arbitrator.50 However, the decisions of each appellate
court suggest that the “substantial deference” standard is the guiding principle for judicial review of an arbitration award.51 The decisions further suggest that when courts apply the “substantial
deference” standard to players’ lawsuits under the current CBA, the
NFL will ultimately prevail.52 The Peterson and Brady cases are instructive in demonstrating the application of this standard of review
45. Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1089 (quoting Associated Elec. Coop., Inc. v.
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 53, 751 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 2014)).
46. Id. (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,
38 (1987)).
47. See id. at 901 (quoting Associated Elec. Coop., 751 F.3d 898, 901) (stating
“[a] court need not merely rubber stamp the arbitrator’s interpretations and
decisions”).
48. Id. (quoting Associated Elec. Coop., 751 F.3d at 901).
49. Id. at 1089 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Peterson II, 831
F.3d 985 (discussing judicial standard of review of arbitrator’s award).
50. See Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1089 (finding in favor of Peterson and
granting vacatur of arbitration award); see also NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d
449, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016)
(finding in favor of Brady and vacating arbitrator’s award upholding Brady’s suspension); see also Elliott I, 270 F. Supp. 3d 939 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2017), vacated and
remanded, Elliott II, 874 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding in favor of Elliott and
granting injunction to prevent NFL from enforcing Elliott’s suspension).
51. See Peterson II, 831 F.3d at 993–98 (providing Eighth Circuit’s holding in
favor of NFL); see also NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 532 (reversing district
court’s decision to vacate arbitration award on grounds that “the Commissioner
properly exercised his broad discretion to resolve an intramural controversy between the League and a player”); see also Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 229 (holding in favor
of NFL and vacating district court’s preliminary injunction against League).
52. See Peterson II, 831 F.3d at 998–99 (upholding arbitration award in favor of
NFL); see also NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 549 (upholding arbitration award
and discipline NFL imposed on Brady); see also Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 229 (holding
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and in setting the context for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in the Elliott case.53
C. The Adrian Peterson Case
On September 11, 2014, a grand jury indicted Peterson on a
charge of felony reckless or negligent injury of a child, as a result of
a May 2014 incident involving his son.54 “Peterson pleaded nolo
contendere to a reduced misdemeanor charge of reckless assault.”55 At the time, Peterson played for the Minnesota Vikings.56
The NFL acknowledged Peterson’s plea and informed him that the
League would review the matter for potential disciplinary action
under the PCP.57 On November 18, 2014, Commissioner Goodell
told Peterson that his conduct during the May 2014 incident was
detrimental to the League.58 The Commissioner then applied the
PCP to Peterson and suspended Peterson without pay for at least
the remainder of the 2014 season, fined him six weeks’ pay, and
ordered him to participate in a counseling and treatment program.59 Notably, the Commissioner applied the updated version of
the PCP, which the Commissioner had enacted on August 28, 2014,
in response to the domestic violence incident involving Baltimore
Ravens running back Ray Rice.60 The updated PCP increased the
sanctions for domestic violence and sexual assault incidents, althat district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue preliminary injunction
against NFL).
53. For discussion of the judicial standard of review for challenges to an arbitrator’s award, see supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text; see also Elliott II, 874
F.3d at 225 (holding in favor of NFL and vacating district court’s preliminary injunction against League).
54. See Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1087 (providing details of charges brought
against Peterson).
55. See id. (noting that, on November 4, 2014, Peterson pleaded nolo contendere to reduced misdemeanor charge of reckless assault, after which court issued deferred adjudication order and placed Peterson on community supervision
for two years).
56. See id. (noting Minnesota Vikings deactivated Peterson shortly after
indictment).
57. See id. (providing NFL’s response to charges against Peterson).
58. See id. at 1088 (discussing NFL Commissioner’s decision to punish Peterson under PCP).
59. See id. at 1087–88 (discussing NFL Commissioner’s decision to punish Peterson for “conduct detrimental to the League” under PCP and stating that results
of Peterson’s time in counseling and treatment would dictate whether he could
return to NFL). The PCP establishes “a baseline discipline of a suspension without
pay for six games for certain offenses, including a first offense of assault, battery, or
domestic violence.” Id.
60. See id. at 1086, 1090 (providing background of updated PCP, which Commissioner Goodell applied to Peterson in response to charges filed against
Peterson).
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lowing “suspension without pay of six games for a first offense, with
consideration given to mitigating factors, as well as a longer suspension when circumstances warrant.”61 Although the PCP was not collectively bargained with the NFLPA, “the [L]eague asserted that the
policy did not require bargaining since Article 46 [of the CBA] empowers Goodell with unlimited discretion on punishments.”62
The NFLPA appealed the discipline on Peterson’s behalf, as
permitted by Article 46 of the CBA.63 In response, the NFL scheduled an arbitration hearing for December 2, 2014 and appointed
Harold Henderson (“Henderson”) as arbitrator.64 The NFLPA
asked Henderson to recuse himself, arguing that his former role as
an NFL executive established “inextricable ties” between Henderson, the League and Commissioner Goodell, and showcased his “evident partiality” toward the League.65 Henderson declined to
recuse himself, and the arbitration commenced as planned.66
During arbitration, the NFLPA asked Henderson to consider
four issues: whether (1) Commissioner Goodell had impermissibly
applied the updated PCP to Peterson; (2) Peterson was deprived of
a fair disciplinary process; (3) Commissioner Goodell’s requirement that Peterson undergo psychiatric counseling was permissible
under the CBA; and (4) the NFL’s Exempt List could be used as a
form of discipline under the CBA.67
61. Id. at 1086–87 (stating that updated PCP increased sanctions that League
could impose on players who had been involved in incidents of domestic violence
or sexual assault).
62. Michael McCann, Roger Goodell’s Power to Discipline Stronger Than Ever After
Win vs. Adrian Peterson, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.si.com/
nfl/2016/08/04/adrian-peterson-appeals-court-suspension-roger-goodell-wins
[https://perma.cc/26YY-2MWH] (discussing NFL’s rationale in enacting updated
PCP without securing agreement of NFLPA).
63. See Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1088 (acknowledging Peterson’s decision
to enlist NFLPA to appeal discipline imposed by Commissioner against him); see
also 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46, § 1(a) (providing NFL player or NFLPA may appeal
Commissioner-imposed discipline within three business days of Commissioner’s
notice of action to player).
64. See Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1088 (stating NFL selected Henderson to
serve as arbitrator for Peterson’s December 2, 2014 hearing).
65. See id. (discussing Henderson’s current and past relationship with NFL).
Notably, Henderson had served as NFL executive for nearly two decades and had
earned $2.5 million in compensation from NFL since 2009. Id. at 1088 n.2.
66. See id. (providing that Henderson declined to recuse himself from role as
arbitrator for Peterson’s hearing).
67. See id. at 1088–89 (listing four issues raised by NFLPA on behalf of Peterson during arbitration proceedings); see also McCann, supra note 62 (noting that
Goodell had placed Peterson on Commissioner’s Exempt List, “a form of administrative suspension where Peterson would be paid while ineligible to play”).
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Regarding the first issue, the NFLPA argued that Commissioner Goodell was required to apply the PCP that was in effect in
May 2014—the time of Peterson’s misconduct—rather than the updated version that was enacted in August 2014.68 The NFLPA asserted that, under the prior version of the PCP, the Commissioner’s
disciplinary authority was limited to the imposition of a maximum
two-game suspension and a fine for a first-time domestic violence
offense.69 The NFLPA asked Henderson to reduce Peterson’s punishment accordingly.70 Henderson rejected the NFLPA’s arguments on this issue and the three others it raised in arbitration, and
he upheld the Commissioner’s discipline.71
On December 15, 2014, the NFLPA filed a petition in the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota to vacate
the arbitration award under the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”) and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).72 The NFLPA
argued in favor of vacating the award on four grounds:
(1) [the arbitration award] violated the essence of the
CBA; (2) Henderson exceeded his authority by deciding
the matter based on the hypothetical question of whether
Peterson’s punishment was permissible under the former
PCP; (3) the award was fundamentally unfair given the retroactive application of the updated PCP and the procedural irregularities in the pre-discipline process; and (4)
Henderson was an evidently partial arbitrator.73
The district court found that vacatur was warranted on the basis of the first two arguments.74 Specifically, the court ruled that
the updated PCP should not have been applied retroactively to Pe68. See Peterson II, 831 F.3d 985, 990–91 (8th Cir. 2016) (providing NFLPA’s
argument that Commissioner Goodell was required to abide by “custom and practice” under PCP in effect at time of Peterson’s misconduct).
69. See id. at 991 (noting Commissioner Goodell’s scope of authority).
70. See id. at 990–91 (stating that NFLPA asked Henderson to amend Peterson’s punishment to two-game suspension and fine equivalent to two-weeks’
salary).
71. See Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1089 (providing decision of Henderson as
arbitrator for Peterson’s appeal).
72. See id. (providing details of NFLPA’s claim in federal court on behalf of
Peterson); see also Labor Management Relations Act § 310, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169
(1935) (outlining provisions for vacating arbitration awards); see also Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1925) (providing circumstances in which it is
appropriate to vacate arbitration awards).
73. Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1090 (listing arguments made by NFLPA on
behalf of Peterson in support of petition to vacate arbitration award).
74. See id. at 1090–92 (providing district court’s finding in favor of NFLPA
and Peterson).
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terson and that “Henderson exceeded his authority by adjudicating
the hypothetical question of whether Peterson’s discipline could be
sustained under the previous [PCP].”75 Judge Doty, who wrote the
court’s opinion, criticized Commissioner Goodell for his decision
to apply the updated PCP to Peterson.76 Judge Doty referenced the
Commissioner’s August 2014 statement to the public noting that
the new domestic abuse provisions of the updated PCP constituted
a “change” in League policy.77 In Judge Doty’s opinion, this statement amounted to an implied admission by Commissioner Goodell
that he had disciplined Peterson under the new PCP.78
The NFL appealed to the Eighth Circuit because it was unwilling to accept its loss in district court.79 The League raised only one
issue on appeal: whether it could collect the Commissioner’s fine
against Peterson that Henderson upheld during arbitration.80 On
August 4, 2016, the court issued an opinion in full agreement with
the NFL.81 Judge Colloton, who wrote the opinion on behalf of the
panel, began by emphasizing the limited authority of federal courts
in vacating arbitration awards.82 Judge Colloton stated that the
Eighth Circuit could “not apply [its] own view of what would be
appropriate player discipline, and . . . do[es] not review whether
the arbitrator ‘correctly’ construed the Collective Bargaining Agreement when he reviewed the Commissioner’s decision.”83 Instead,
75. Id. (providing district court’s rationale for granting vacatur of arbitration
award).
76. See McCann, supra note 62 (asserting that Judge Doty was critical of Commissioner Goodell in finding for NFLPA and Peterson and granting petition of
vacatur).
77. See Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1090–91 (“Henderson’s conclusion that the
[updated PCP] is consistent with the previous [PCP] is contradicted by the Commissioner’s own statements in which he acknowledged that the [updated PCP]
included ‘changes.’ ”).
78. See McCann, supra note 62 (quoting Judge Doty’s criticism of Commissioner Goodell for applying updated PCP to Peterson, and stating, “[t]o Judge
Doty, the commissioner’s own words indicated that Peterson was the recipient of a
retroactive punishment”).
79. See Peterson II, 831 F.3d 985, 992–93 (8th Cir. 2016) (providing background of Peterson case, including district court’s ruling, and NFL’s decision to
appeal to Eighth Circuit).
80. See id. at 989 (noting that NFL’s appeal only concerned monetary sanction
Commissioner Goodell imposed against Peterson and arbitrator upheld).
81. See id. at 993–99 (holding in favor of NFL, reversing district court’s judgment, and remanding with instructions to dismiss NFLPA’s petition to vacate arbitration award).
82. See id. at 993 (citing Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532
U.S. 504 (2001)) (“In an arbitration case like this one, the role of the courts is very
limited.”).
83. Id. (clarifying Eighth Circuit’s limited scope of review in analysis of Peterson’s case).
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the court confined its analysis to deciding whether Henderson had
plausibly applied Article 46 of the CBA and reasonably interpreted
the “law of the shop,” which requires consistency in arbitration
awards.84
After applying those principles, the Eighth Circuit found “no
basis for setting aside the decision [of the arbitrator].”85 Writing
for the court, Judge Colloton reasoned that Henderson acted
within his authority as an arbitrator when he determined that Commissioner Goodell had not changed the PCP in August 2014, even
though the Commissioner had used the word “change” to describe
the new domestic violence provisions and corresponding disciplinary measures for players.86 As Judge Colloton reasoned, “the
Commissioner is not forever bound to historical precedent if prior
discipline under the Personal Conduct Policy provided insufficient
deterrence.”87 “In other words, the League might change its discipline without changing its policy.”88 Thus, Judge Colloton
“thought it was ‘unnecessary’ under federal law for Henderson ‘to
decide whether the Commissioner applied an ‘old’ policy, a ‘new’
policy, or simply a ‘single’ policy that encompassed the writings
from both June and August.’”89 The Eighth Circuit afforded substantial deference to the NFL in its resolution of the Peterson
case.90 The outcome was not an unfamiliar one, though, given the
holding of the Second Circuit in the Brady case just four months
earlier.91
84. See id. at 995–96 (outlining limited scope of review for federal court in
arbitration cases and stating: “In any event, the question for a reviewing court is
not whether the arbitrator’s distinctions were correct, but whether the arbitrator
was arguably construing and applying the contract and the law of the shop”).
85. Id. at 996 (stating court’s finding that arbitration award in favor of NFL
could not be vacated).
86. See id. at 994–95 (providing court’s reasoning for finding that Henderson
had not exceeded scope of his authority as League arbitrator in Peterson hearing).
87. Id. at 995 (offering support for court’s conclusion that August 2014 updates to NFL’s PCP did not constitute “change” in League policy).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 995 (providing court’s finding that federal law did not require Henderson to determine whether Commissioner Goodell had applied updated version
of PCP in imposing discipline on Peterson); see also McCann, supra note 62 (referring to Judge Colloton’s opinion to decide how to apply updated PCP to Peterson’s case).
90. See Peterson II, 831 F.3d at 993–99 (providing Judge Colloton’s reasoning
for holding in favor of NFL and rationale for decision to reverse district court’s
judgment and remand case with instructions to dismiss NFLPA’s petition to vacate
arbitration award).
91. See McCann supra note 62 (“Judge Colloton’s opinion echoed themes that
were enunciated in the . . . opinion by Judges Barrington Parker, Jr. and Denny
Chin against Brady.”).
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D. The Tom Brady Case
On May 11, 2015, the NFL suspended Tom Brady, quarterback
for the New England Patriots, for four games without pay.92 The
suspension came after the League concluded that Brady had participated in a scheme to deflate footballs during the 2015 American
Football Conference Championship Game.93 The NFL also punished the Patriots, imposing a $1 million fine on the team and requiring the Patriots to forfeit their first-round draft pick in 2016
and fourth-round pick in 2017.94 Brady exercised his Article 46
right to appeal the discipline by proceeding to arbitration with the
League.95 Commissioner Goodell served as the arbitrator, which he
is permitted to do under Article 46 of the CBA.96 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Commissioner Goodell upheld the discipline he had imposed on Brady.97 Goodell concluded, “Brady knew about,
approved of, consented to, and provided inducements and rewards
in support of a scheme by which, [Patriots’ employees] tampered
with the game balls.”98
Brady enlisted the NFLPA to appeal the arbitration award in
federal court.99 The NFLPA filed a petition to vacate the award on
Brady’s behalf in the Southern District of New York.100 In re92. See NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 531 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting decision to discipline Brady without pay for four games).
93. See id. (providing background of NFL’s decision to suspend Brady).
94. See NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting
that New England Patriots were also disciplined by NFL for 2015 incident involving
deflated footballs), rev’d, NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527.
95. See id. at 457 (opting to appeal through Players Association); 2011 NFL
CBA, Art. 46 (outlining NFL protocols for “Commissioner Discipline,” including
process by which players are permitted to appeal discipline and proceed to
arbitration).
96. See NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 457 (noting Goodell opted to
serve as arbitrator for Brady’s hearing); see also 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46 (stating
“Commissioner or his designee” are entitled to serve as hearing officers in
arbitration).
97. See NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 461–62 (stating outcome of
Brady’s arbitration hearing, in which Commissioner Goodell served as arbitrator).
98. Id. (noting Commissioner Goodell based his July 28, 2015 decision on
“the available electronic evidence, coupled with information compiled in the investigators’ interviews”).
99. See NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 531–32 (providing information on
NFLPA’s petition to vacate Commissioner Goodell’s arbitration award).
100. See id. at 535 (providing NFLPA’s argument that Brady lacked notice that
his conduct was prohibited and punishable by suspension, and that arbitration
proceedings were conducted in unfair way, thereby depriving him of fundamental
fairness).
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sponse, the NFL filed a cross-motion to confirm Commissioner
Goodell’s arbitration award.101
Like Peterson, Brady prevailed in district court.102 In its September 3, 2015 opinion, the court granted the NFLPA’s petition to
vacate the arbitration award upholding Brady’s suspension.103 The
ruling invalidated Brady’s suspension and enabled him to play for
the Patriots in week one of the regular season.104 In support of its
decision to vacate the award, the court said the award was “premised upon several significant legal deficiencies, including . . . inadequate notice to Brady of both his potential discipline . . . and his
alleged misconduct.”105
The NFL filed an appeal with the Second Circuit on the same
day the district court entered its opinion in favor of Brady and the
NFLPA.106 Shortly after, on September 25, 2015, the NFL moved
for an expedited briefing, and the NFLPA consented.107 In its appellate brief, the NFL argued that the district court’s decision to
invalidate Brady’s suspension was “unfathomable” and that the
lower court “reached an ‘inexplicable’ conclusion when [it] determined that the league failed to adequately warn Brady of the potential suspension and made errors in its investigation that required
him to nullify the penalty.”108 The NFLPA responded by asserting
that the district court had reached the correct conclusion, because
101. See NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 452 (noting NFL’s attempt to
vacate arbitration award).
102. See id. at 463 (holding in favor of Brady and NFLPA and granting
NFLPA’s petition to vacate League arbitration award upholding Brady’s suspension); see also Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1090–91 (D. Minn. 2015) (stating
district court’s finding in favor of Peterson and NFLPA), rev’d and remanded sub
nom. Peterson II, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016).
103. See NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 463 (holding in favor of
NFLPA and Brady).
104. See Tom Brady Suspension Case Timeline, NFL.COM (July 15, 2016, 3:24 PM),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000492189/article/tom-brady-suspension-case-timeline [https://perma.cc/4AS5-W29Q] (listing key dates in Brady case
and noting that district court’s ruling enabled Brady to resume playing football).
105. NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 463 (providing court’s grounds
for vacating arbitration award upholding Brady’s discipline, including court’s assertion that arbitration award was premised upon “denial of the opportunity for
Brady to examine one of two lead investigators . . . and . . . denial of equal access to
investigative files, including witness interview notes”).
106. See Tom Brady Suspension Case Timeline, supra note 104 (outlining key
points in chronology of Brady’s case, including NFL’s decision to appeal to Second
Circuit after district court found in favor of NFLPA and Brady).
107. See id. (noting that NFL filed motion for expedited briefing on appeal
and providing NFLPA’s decision to consent to motion).
108. Id. (summarizing main argument made by NFL on appeal and quoting
NFL’s brief).
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Commissioner Goodell had indeed acted outside of the scope of his
authority when he suspended Brady.109 The NFL then filed its final
appellate brief, arguing that Commissioner Goodell’s decision to
suspend Brady was an appropriate exercise of his power to discipline players under the CBA.110
The NFL’s decision to appeal to the Second Circuit proved to
be a wise one, because the court found in favor of the League in its
April 2016 opinion.111 The court reversed the district court’s decision to vacate the arbitration award on the grounds that “the Commissioner properly exercised his broad discretion to resolve an
intramural controversy between the League and a player.”112 The
court further concluded that each of the three bases for overturning Brady’s suspension in district court “was insufficient to warrant
vacatur and that none of the [NFLPA]’s remaining arguments had
merit.”113 The Second Circuit continued by highlighting the significance of the CBA and the extent of its final authority in disputes
between the League, the NFLPA, and the players.114 The court
stated:
Here, the parties contracted in the CBA to specifically allow the Commissioner to sit as the arbitrator in all disputes brought pursuant to Article 46, Section 1(a). They
did so knowing full well that the Commissioner had the
sole power of determining what constitutes ‘conduct detrimental,’ and thus knowing that the Commissioner would
have a stake both in the underlying discipline and in every
arbitration brought pursuant to Section 1(a). Had the parties wished to restrict the Commissioner’s authority, they
could have fashioned a different agreement.115
109. See id. (noting that NFLPA filed its appellate brief on December 7, 2015).
110. See id. (stating NFL filed its final appellate brief on December 21, 2015);
see also PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY: LEAGUE POLICIES FOR PLAYERS, 1, (2016) available at https://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/photo/2017/08/11/0ap
3000000828506.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FNN-ZFEP] (requiring all players to refrain from “ ‘conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in’ the
NFL”).
111. See NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 2016) (reversing
district court’s holding in favor of NFLPA and Brady).
112. Id. (offering findings of Second Circuit in favor of NFL, including that
Commissioner Goodell did not exceed scope of his authority under CBA).
113. Id. at 538 (providing court’s rationale for reversing district court’s decision and finding in favor of NFL).
114. See id. at 548 (discussing CBA’s binding nature on parties and how parties could have negotiated CBA differently).
115. Id. (acknowledging power of CBA and its existence as document mutually agreed upon by parties and thus controlling in disputes).
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In his dissent, Judge Katzmann criticized the actions of Commissioner Goodell and asserted that the Commissioner violated the
CBA in disciplining Brady.116 First, Judge Katzmann cited Article
46 of the CBA as requiring the Commissioner to provide a player
with notice of the basis for any disciplinary action and an opportunity to challenge the discipline in an appeal hearing.117 Judge
Katzmann asserted that the Commissioner had violated this requirement by “act[ing] in his capacity as an arbitrator, chang[ing]
the factual basis for the disciplinary action after the appeal hearing
[had] conclude[d].”118 In doing this, Judge Katzmann argued,
Commissioner Goodell had “undermine[d] the fair notice for
which the [NFLPA] bargained, deprive[d] the player of an opportunity to confront the case against him, and, it follows, exceed[ed]
his limited authority under the CBA to decide ‘appeals’ of disciplinary decisions.”119
Judge Katzmann also stated that he was “troubled by the Commissioner’s decision to uphold the unprecedented four-game suspension,” because the Commissioner had failed to even consider a
highly relevant alternative penalty, and relied, instead, on an inapt
analogy to the League’s steroid policy.”120 Judge Katzmann asserted that, in this regard, Commissioner Goodell’s decision to suspend Brady was unenforceable because it did not draw its essence
from the CBA.121 Judge Katzmann argued that Commissioner
Goodell should have considered the penalty imposed on players
116. See id. at 549 (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (asserting that Second Circuit
majority reached incorrect conclusion and that district court’s decision to vacate
League arbitration award should have been upheld).
117. See id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (providing Judge Katzmann’s first of
three dissenting arguments that Commissioner failed to provide required notice to
Brady of basis for disciplinary action against him and failed to give Brady fair opportunity to appeal discipline); see also 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46 (requiring League
Commissioner to notify player with basis for Commissioner’s decision to discipline
player and to provide player with opportunity to challenge discipline in arbitration
hearing).
118. NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 549–50 (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (asserting that Commissioner Goodell violated Article 46 when he imposed discipline
on Brady, and asserting that Goodell changed factual basis for Brady’s disciplinary
action after conclusion of appeal hearing).
119. Id. at 549 (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (arguing specific CBA violations by
Commissioner Goodell).
120. See id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (arguing Commissioner Goodell failed
to consider alternative penalty for Brady, opting to impose four-game suspension
instead).
121. See id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (asserting that Commissioner Goodell
should have considered other forms of discipline for Brady). For a discussion of
the standard of judicial review of an arbitration award, see supra notes 42–52 and
accompanying text.
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who use stickum, a substance that enhances a player’s grip, instead
of suspending Brady for four games.122 In support of this argument, Judge Katzmann stated that, because “both the use of
stickum and the deflation of footballs involve attempts at improving
one’s grip and evading the referees’ enforcement of the rules, this
would seem a natural starting point for assessing Brady’s penalty.”123 Judge Katzmann suggested that Commissioner Goodell’s
decision to ignore the stickum penalty showed an overall failure of
the award to draw its essence from the CBA.124
Judge Katzmann concluded his dissent by emphasizing the importance of the CBA as a commitment to fairness by both parties,
and condemning the Commissioner’s abuse of his power under the
agreement.125 “The Commissioner’s authority is . . . broad,” Judge
Katzmann stated, “[b]ut it is not limitless, and its boundaries are
defined by the CBA.”126 Judge Katzmann described the Article 46
appeals process as a means of curbing the Commissioner’s authority to discipline players.127 Judge Katzmann also said it was “ironic
. . . that a process designed to ensure fairness to all players has been
used unfairly against one player.”128
III.

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

OF THE

ELLIOTT CASE

In 2016, Tiffany Thompson (“Thompson”) brought allegations
of domestic violence against Ezekiel Elliott in Columbus, Ohio.129
Columbus law enforcement officers investigated the allegations and
declined to arrest or prosecute Elliott based on “conflicting and inconsistent information across all incidents.”130 Pursuant to the
122. See id. at 552 (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (noting NFL player is subject to
fine of $8,268 for using stickum in absence of aggravating circumstances).
123. Id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (offering support for
argument that Commissioner Goodell should have imposed fine on Brady).
124. See id. at 553 (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (bolstering argument that Commissioner’s arbitration award failed to draw its essence from CBA and thus warranted vacatur by reviewing court).
125. See id. at 554 (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (providing third and final argument of Judge Katzmann’s dissent).
126. Id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (acknowledging authority of Commissioner Goodell over League but noting limits to his authority).
127. See id. at 549–50 (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (suggesting that players’ right
to appeal League-imposed discipline constitutes check on League Commissioner’s
power under Article 46 of CBA).
128. Id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting) (addressing how Commissioner Goodell’s
power presses unfair discipline and appeal procedures on NFL players).
129. See Elliott I, 270 F. Supp. 3d 939, 944 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2017) (providing
background on domestic violence allegations Thompson made against Elliott), vacated and remanded, Elliott II, 874 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2017).
130. See id. (referencing findings of Columbus law enforcement).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019

17

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\26-1\VLS102.txt

unknown

Seq: 18

21-FEB-19

10:44

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 2

56

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26: p. 39

PCP, the NFL opted to conduct its own investigation to determine
whether Elliott should be disciplined by the League.131 Kia Roberts
(“Roberts”), Director of Investigations for the NFL, and Lisa Friel
(“Friel”), Senior Vice President and Special Counsel for Investigations for the NFL, were selected to conduct the investigation into
the allegations against Elliott.132 The investigation lasted for a year
and concluded with the production of an investigative report.133
Roberts was the only investigator who participated in all twenty-two
of the witness interviews, including those with Thompson, Elliott’s
accuser, whom Roberts interviewed six times.134 Friel was not present for any of the witness interviews.135 Commissioner Goodell
also assembled a team of outside advisors who met on June 26, 2017
to discuss the allegations against Elliott and whether the League
should punish him.136 The advisors also interviewed Elliott.137
Roberts was excluded from the meeting with Commissioner Goodell and the outside advisors, but Friel was included.138
On August 11, 2017, Elliott received a letter informing him
that Commissioner Goodell had decided to impose a six-game suspension on him.139 Elliott enlisted the NFLPA to appeal the sus131. See id. (providing NFL’s decision to investigate allegations against Elliott
after law enforcement declined to arrest or prosecute Elliott); see also PERSONAL
CONDUCT POLICY: LEAGUE POLICIES FOR PLAYERS, supra note 110, at 1 (“It is a privilege to be part of the National Football League. Everyone who is part of the
league must refrain from ‘conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in’ the NFL. . . . Conduct by anyone in the league that is illegal, violent,
dangerous, or irresponsible puts innocent victims at risk, damages the reputation
of others in the game, and undercuts public respect and support for the NFL. We
must endeavor at all times to be people of high character; we must show respect
for others inside and outside our workplace; and we must strive to conduct ourselves in ways that favorably reflect on ourselves, our teams, the communities we
represent, and the NFL.”).
132. See Elliott I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 944 (noting Roberts and Friel were selected to lead NFL’s investigation into allegations against Elliott).
133. See id. (discussing investigative report Roberts and Friel produced at conclusion of Elliott investigation).
134. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 230 (Graves, J., dissenting) (noting Roberts had
attended all witness interviews during investigation).
135. See id. (noting that, in contrast to Roberts, Friel participated in no witness interviews).
136. See Elliott I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 944 (acknowledging that Commissioner
Goodell assembled team of outside advisors to assist in deciding whether to discipline Elliott).
137. See id. (noting that outside advisors assembled by Commissioner Goodell
interviewed Elliott).
138. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 230 (Graves, J., dissenting) (noting Roberts was
excluded from meeting with Commissioner Goodell and outside advisors, even
though Friel was included).
139. See Elliott I, 270 F. Supp. 3d 939 at 944 (stating Elliott learned of Leagueimposed suspension after receiving letter from Commissioner Goodell); see also
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pension on his behalf, in accordance with the CBA’s procedures for
appealing Commissioner-imposed discipline.140 As previously
stated, the CBA mandates that player appeals be heard by an arbitrator.141 The arbitrator decides whether the Commissioner’s decision “was made on unreasonable grounds or without any proper
consideration of circumstances.”142 Commissioner Goodell assigned Henderson to serve as the arbitrator in Elliott’s appeal.143
During arbitration, the NFLPA filed a motion to compel the
NFL to provide Thompson for cross-examination.144 The NFLPA
also sought to compel the testimony of Roberts and asked that the
NFL provide Roberts’s investigative notes.145 The NFL objected to
the request for Roberts’s testimony, arguing that testimony from
Roberts would be “cumulative and unnecessary” due to the fact that
Friel would attend the hearing.146 Henderson denied the NFLPA’s
request that Thompson be compelled to testify and denied the request to receive Roberts’s investigative notes.147 However, HenderElliott II, 874 F.3d at 230 (Graves, J., dissenting) (noting that, per NFL and NFLPA
CBA, League Commissioner has sole authority to punish players).
140. See Elliott I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 944 (providing Elliott’s decision to enlist
NFLPA to file suit on his behalf); see also 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 42, § 4 (noting that
any player who wishes to dispute discipline imposed by NFL team must adhere to
Article 43’s procedure for initiating “Non-Injury Grievance,” which requires player
or NFLPA file written notice of appeal with NFLMC).
141. See Elliott I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 944 (noting that NFL requires arbitration
for resolution of player appeals of League-imposed discipline); see also 2011 NFL
CBA, Art. 15 (stating that “System Arbitrator” will have exclusive jurisdiction to
enforce terms of certain Articles of CBA, including those pertaining to player appeals of League discipline).
142. Elliott I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 944 (providing standard of review which arbitrator must apply when hearing appeal from NFL player); see also 2011 NFL CBA,
Art. 43, § 8 (discussing arbitrator’s decision and award, including timing and
effect).
143. See Elliott I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 944 (providing that Commissioner Goodell
selected Harold Henderson to serve as arbitrator for Elliott’s appeal); see also Peterson I, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1088 (D. Minn. 2015) (noting Henderson was NFL
executive for nearly two decades and earned $2.5 million in compensation from
NFL since 2009), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Peterson II, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir.
2016).
144. See Elliott I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 944 (discussing NFLPA’s motion to compel
arbitrator to order Elliott’s accuser, Thompson, to undergo cross-examination during arbitration).
145. See id. (stating that NFLPA also sought to compel testimony of Roberts,
who led NFL’s investigation into allegations against Elliott, and to receive Roberts’
investigative notes).
146. See id. (noting that NFL objected to NFLPA’s request for Roberts to testify during arbitration proceedings).
147. See id. (providing arbitrator’s decision to deny NFLPA’s request that
Thompson be compelled to testify and its requests to receive Roberts’ investigative
notes).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019

19

\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\26-1\VLS102.txt

unknown

Seq: 20

21-FEB-19

10:44

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 26, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 2

58

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26: p. 39

son granted the NFLPA’s motion to compel Roberts to testify at the
arbitration proceeding.148
The NFLPA and Elliott learned during arbitration that Roberts
had concluded that the allegations of domestic violence against Elliott were “incredible, inconsistent, and without corroborating evidence to sufficiently support any discipline against Elliott.”149
During arbitration, the NFLPA and Elliott also learned of Commissioner Goodell’s meeting with Friel and the team of outside advisors, and that Roberts had been excluded from that meeting.150 In
response, the NFLPA asked Henderson to compel Commissioner
Goodell to testify.151 The NFLPA argued that the Commissioner’s
testimony was necessary in order to determine whether the Commissioner had knowledge of all critical facts, namely Roberts’s conclusions about the allegations against Elliott, at the time the
Commissioner decided to suspend Elliott.152 Henderson denied
the request.153
The three-day arbitration concluded on August 31, 2017.154
The next day, the NFLPA sued the NFL on behalf of Elliott in the
Eastern District of Texas, seeking vacatur of Henderson’s impending decision.155 The NFLPA also filed an emergency motion for a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent the NFL from enforcing the Commissioner-imposed six-game
suspension of Elliott.156 The NFLPA asserted that its emergency
148. See id. (noting that arbitrator granted NFLPA’s motion to compel Roberts to testify during arbitration proceedings).
149. See id. (quoting Roberts’s findings as to credibility of accusations made
against Elliott by Thompson).
150. See id. at 944 (noting that, prior to arbitration proceedings, NFLPA and
Elliott were unaware of Commissioner Goodell’s meeting with Friel and outside
advisors and that Roberts was excluded from that meeting), vacated and remanded,
Elliott II, 874 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2017).
151. See id. (stating that NFLPA asked arbitrator to compel testimony of Commissioner Goodell after NFLPA and Elliott learned of meeting between Commissioner Goodell, outside advisors, and Friel).
152. See id. (discussing NFLPA’s argument that Commissioner Goodell should
be required to testify in order to determine whether he reviewed all material facts
during his decision-making process).
153. See id. (stating Henderson’s decision to deny request by NFLPA on behalf of Elliott to compel Commissioner Goodell to testify during arbitration).
154. See id. (providing that arbitration proceedings for Elliott’s appeal concluded on August 31, 2017, at which time arbitrator stated that its decision would
be finalized soon).
155. See id. at 944 (noting NFLPA filed lawsuit on behalf of Elliott in federal
district court for Eastern District of Texas).
156. See id. (detailing NFLPA’s initial actions on behalf of Elliott in Eastern
District of Texas).
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motion was warranted because the NFL regular season was set to
begin shortly.157
A preliminary injunction hearing was conducted by the Eastern District of Texas on September 5, 2017.158 On that same day,
Henderson issued the arbitration decision affirming Commissioner
Goodell’s six-game suspension of Elliott, and the NFL filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York, seeking to confirm and
enforce the arbitration award.159 In response, the Eastern District
of Texas delayed ruling on the NFLPA’s emergency motion and
called for additional briefing on jurisdiction and the issuance of the
arbitrator’s decision.160 Three days later, on September 8, 2017,
the Eastern District of Texas entered an opinion and order granting the NFLPA’s motion and enjoining Elliott’s suspension, pending the court’s final ruling on the petition for vacatur of
Henderson’s arbitration decision.161
On September 11, 2017, the NFL filed a notice of appeal and
an emergency motion to stay the injunction in the Eastern District
of Texas.162 The court responded by entering an order for expedited briefing on the NFL’s emergency motion.163 The NFL opted
not to wait for the Eastern District court to rule on its motion.164
Instead, the League filed an emergency motion for stay pending
appeal with the Fifth Circuit on September 15, 2017.165 The East157. See id. (explaining that NFLPA filed emergency motion for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction against NFL because start of regular
season was less than two weeks away).
158. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d 222, 231 (5th Cir. 2017) (Graves, J., dissenting)
(providing details of preliminary injunction hearing held by district court).
159. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (stating outcome of Elliott’s arbitration
hearing and NFL’s response to arbitrator’s award and NFLPA’s actions on behalf
of Elliott in district court).
160. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (discussing district court’s response to arbitrator’s award and complaint NFL filed in Southern District of New York).
161. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (stating decision of Eastern District of
Texas to grant NFLPA’s emergency motion for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to prevent NFL from enforcing six-game suspension of
Elliott).
162. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (discussing NFL’s response to decision of
Eastern District of Texas in favor of NFLPA and Elliott).
163. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (noting that both parties filed their briefs
in compliance with district court for Eastern District of Texas’s deadline).
164. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (acknowledging NFL’s decision not to wait
for Eastern District of Texas to rule on its emergency motion to stay injunction
preventing implementation of Elliott’s suspension).
165. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (stating that NFL filed emergency motion
for stay pending appeal with Fifth Circuit in September 2017).
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ern District of Texas denied the NFL’s motion for stay on September 18, 2017.166
The NFLPA and the NFL delivered oral arguments before a
panel of the Fifth Circuit.167 On October 12, 2017, the majority
concluded in a 2-1 decision that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction when it issued the preliminary injunction.168
The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction
and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
dismiss.169
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT SHOWS “SUBSTANTIAL
DEFERENCE” IN GIVING THE NFL ANOTHER APPELLATE WIN

The Elliott case concluded with the Fifth Circuit’s decision to
reverse the holding of the district court and its finding in favor of
the NFL.170 The Fifth Circuit majority held that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Elliott case because
the NFLPA filed its action prematurely, without having exhausted
the requisite contractual procedures under the CBA.171 Specifically, the majority asserted that exhaustion is required under the
LMRA and that satisfaction of that requirement entails awaiting the
issuance of the final decision of the arbitrator.172
Prior to considering the soundness of the Fifth Circuit’s holding and its potential impact, it is necessary to analyze the court’s
reasoning for reaching its decision.173 The majority began by acknowledging that preliminary injunctions, such as the one granted
by the district court, are typically reviewed under an “abuse of dis166. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (providing outcome of NFL’s motion for
stay pending appeal with Fifth Circuit).
167. See id. at 225 (majority opinion) (acknowledging that NFL and NFLPA
delivered oral arguments before panel of Fifth Circuit on October 2, 2017).
168. See id. (providing Fifth Circuit’s holding in favor of NFL).
169. See id. (stating Fifth Circuit’s decision to remand Elliott case to district
court with instructions to dismiss because district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue injunction).
170. See id. at 227–28 (providing holding of Fifth Circuit majority in favor of
NFL).
171. See id. (asserting, in its per curiam opinion, that reversal of district
court’s decision was warranted based on lower court’s lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
172. See id. (offering Fifth Circuit’s analysis under LMRA and emphasis on
statute’s exhaustion requirement); see also Labor Management Relations Act § 310,
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1935) (requiring procedures to be exhausted prior to arbitrators administering final decisions).
173. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 222–27 (providing court’s reasoning leading up
to its decision to reverse district court’s decision and find in favor of NFL).
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cretion” standard.174 However, de novo review is appropriate
where, as in the Elliott case, the lower court’s subject matter jurisdiction has been questioned.175 Because the court found the question of subject matter jurisdiction to be dispositive, it did not
address the proper standard of review of the district court’s preliminary injunction.176
In addressing the issue of the lower court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the majority began by reciting the LMRA’s requirement
that a lawsuit for violations between an employer and a labor organization satisfy three elements: “(1) a claim of violation of (2) a contract between (3) an employer and a labor organization.”177 If a
party fails to satisfy these elements in its claim, the failure deprives
the court of subject matter jurisdiction.178 The majority acknowledged the NFLPA’s argument that Elliott had stated a claim that
satisfied these elements and that the district court consequently had
subject matter jurisdiction.179 However, the majority rejected this
argument, opting to accept the NFL’s argument that jurisdiction
would only have vested under the LMRA if Elliott had exhausted
the remedies available to him under the CBA and that “the lack of a
final arbitral decision at the time of filing the complaint” constituted a “fatal jurisdictional defect.”180 In support of its decision to
accept the NFL’s argument on this point, the majority cited Mere174. See id. at 225 (discussing appropriate standard of review of preliminary
injunction in Elliott case).
175. See id. (stating that de novo review of preliminary injunction was appropriate because NFL argued on appeal that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under LMRA because Elliott filed his complaint before arbitrator issued
final decision).
176. See id. at 225 n.2 (citing Houston Refining, L.P. v. United Steel, 765 F.3d
396 (5th Cir. 2014)) (bypassing decision as to whether to apply abuse of discretion
or de novo standard of review).
177. Id. at 225 (quoting Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, 690 F.2d 489, 500 (5th Cir. 1982) (outlining three elements required by
LMRA in lawsuit alleging violations between employer and labor organization); see
also Labor Management Relations Act § 310, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1935) (addressing LMRA requirements between employers and employees that must be
satisfied).
178. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 225 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184–85
(1967)) (ruling that “[o]utside of limited circumstances, the failure to ‘fully exhaust . . . ‘contracted for ‘grievance procedures’ places an employee’s claim for
breach of a collective bargaining agreement beyond ‘judicial review’ ”).
179. See id. (providing argument of NFLPA on behalf of Elliott that Elliott had
in fact satisfied three elements of LMRA and that district court had subject matter
jurisdiction to issue injunction against NFL).
180. Id. at 226 (deciding that Elliott had not exhausted his remedies under
CBA because he had not waited for issuance of arbitrator’s final decision and that
lower court consequently lacked subject matter jurisdiction).
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dith v. Louisiana Federation of Teachers,181 an earlier Fifth Circuit case
applying the LMRA’s exhaustion requirement in the context of a
CBA.182 Per the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Meredith, federal courts
lack subject matter jurisdiction “to decide cases alleging violations
of a collective bargaining agreement . . . by an employee against his
employer unless the employee has exhausted contractual procedures for redress.”183
The NFLPA argued on appeal that Meredith was no longer good
law, and that exhaustion should not be considered an issue of subject matter jurisdiction under the Supreme Court’s holding in
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.184 In Arbaugh, the Supreme Court discussed
the proper utilization of the term “jurisdiction,” and stated that
courts “ha[d] been less than meticulous” in their use of jurisdiction
as a term, particularly in the “subject-matter jurisdiction . . . dichotomy.”185 The Fifth Circuit majority responded to the NFLPA’s argument by citing the Supreme Court’s holding in Henderson ex rel.
Henderson v. Shinseki,186 clarifying its earlier decision in Arbaugh.187
In Henderson, the Supreme Court stated that “claims-processing
rules, which are rules ‘requiring that a party take certain procedural steps at certain specified times,’ are not jurisdictional . . . unless
Congress clearly indicated the rule was ‘jurisdictional.’”188 But, as
the Fifth Circuit majority noted, the Henderson Court also said there
were no “magic words” that “Congress needed to invoke, and if
there was a ‘long line of this Court’s decisions left undisturbed by
Congress’ treating a requirement as jurisdictional, the Court would
‘presume that Congress intended to follow that course.’”189 The
majority continued by stating that the Supreme Court has consistently treated the exhaustion of CBA grievance procedures as juris181. 209 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying LMRA to decide dispute between
union employee and union over CBA).
182. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 226 (citing Meredith, 209 F.3d at 402) (holding
that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide cases involving CBAs
unless party bringing claim has availed self of all available remedies under CBA).
183. Id. (quoting Meredith, 209 F.3d at 402) (ruling on application of LMRA’s
exhaustion requirement in context of CBA).
184. See id. (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510–11 (2006))
(noting that Supreme Court in Arbaugh considered proper classification of issues
as jurisdictional).
185. Id. at 226 (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510–11 (2006)) (providing guidance on what constitutes jurisdictional issue).
186. 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011) (applying Arbaugh to determine whether Congress intended for rule to be jurisdictional).
187. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 226–27 (citing Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435) (clarifying Supreme Court’s holding in Arbaugh).
188. Id. (quoting Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435–36).
189. Id. at 227 (quoting Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436).
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dictional, and that Meredith remains good law, even in light of
Arbaugh.190
On this basis, the majority rejected the NFLPA’s assertion that
exhaustion is not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.191 This
marked a pivotal point in the majority’s analysis, because it meant
that the determination of whether the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction in the Elliott case would depend on whether Elliott had exhausted the remedies available to him under the CBA
prior to bringing his claim.192
The majority quickly classified Elliott’s claim in district court as
“premature,” because Elliott and the NFLPA had not exhausted the
grievance procedures set forth in the CBA.193 “At the time the
NFLPA filed the complaint,” the majority stated, “it was possible the
arbitrator could have issued a final decision that was favorable to
Elliott.”194 The majority went on to state that “Elliott cannot show it
was futile to wait for a final decision simply because he believed the
arbitrator would issue an unfavorable ruling.”195 Thus, “[a]s there
was no final decision,” the majority ruled that “Elliott had not yet
exhausted the contracted-for remedies.”196
Having concluded that Elliott’s district court claim was premature, the Fifth Circuit majority next turned to the issue of whether
Elliott’s failure to exhaust the contractual remedies available to him
under the CBA could be excused.197 Per the Fifth Circuit’s holding
in Rabalais v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,198 there are three recognized
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement.199 Under Rabalais, a
190. See id. (asserting that Fifth Circuit had not overturned Meredith).
191. See id. (stating that LMRA’s exhaustion requirement is indeed issue of
subject matter jurisdiction).
192. See id. at 226 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184–85 (1967)) (stating party’s failure to exhaust all remedies available to party under CBA will deprive
court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear party’s claim).
193. See id. at 227–28 (deciding Elliott had not satisfied exhaustion requirement and that his lawsuit was thus “premature”).
194. Id. at 228 (providing majority’s rationale for determining that Elliott’s
lawsuit was “premature” and that he had failed to fully exhaust grievance procedures available under CBA).
195. Id.
196. Id. (declaring that Elliott failed to satisfy exhaustion requirement by filing claim in district court prior to issuance of arbitrator’s final decision).
197. See id. (introducing potential for excusal of Elliott’s failure to exhaust
CBA remedies).
198. 566 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978) (outlining the three recognized exceptions
to LMRA’s exhaustion requirement).
199. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 228 (citing Rabalais, 566 F.2d at 519) (listing
three exceptions to exhaustion requirement).
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party’s failure to exhaust the contracted-for remedies available to
him or her can be excused if:
(1) the union wrongfully refuses to process the employee’s
grievance, thus violating its duty of fair representation; (2)
the employer’s conduct amounts to a repudiation of the
remedial procedures specified in the contract; or (3) exhaustion of contractual remedies would be futile because
the aggrieved employee would have to submit his claim to
a group which is in large part chosen by the employer and
union against whom his real complaint is made.200
The majority only addressed the second exception, which pertains to repudiation of the CBA, because that was the only one
raised as applicable by the NFLPA.201 As stated by the majority: “An
allegation that an employer has repudiated the grievance process is
not substantiated merely by its ‘refusal to accept an employee’s position with respect to a grievance.’”202 The majority also cited Meredith, in which the Fifth Circuit held that the repudiation exception
applies where an employer fails to consider an employee’s grievance.203 The facts of the Elliott case were distinguishable from the
facts of Meredith, the majority asserted, because the NFL did not
refuse to consider Elliott’s grievance under the CBA.204 In the Elliott case, the NFL and Elliott had engaged in arbitration, as provided for under the CBA.205 “[F]or the repudiation exception to
the exhaustion requirements to apply, the NFL would have had to
completely refuse to engage in the process.”206 Thus, the majority
concluded that the NFL had not repudiated the agreement and
that the repudiation exception from Rabalais did not apply.207 Ac200. Id. (quoting Rabalais, 566 F.2d at 519).
201. See id. (citing NFLPA’s argument that second Rabalais exception should
apply to Elliott because NFL had repudiated CBA).
202. Id. (quoting Rabalais, 566 F.2d at 519).
203. See id. at 229 (citing Meredith v. La. Fed’n of Teachers, 209 F.3d 398, 403
(5th Cir. 2000)). The Meredith court found that the repudiation exception from
Rabalais applied to its case. See Meredith, 209 F.3d at 403.
204. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 229 (distinguishing facts of Elliott case from facts
of Meredith, in which employer altogether failed to consider employee’s grievance).
205. See id. (acknowledging that NFL had provided arbitration hearing for
Elliott’s appeal); see also 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46 (outlining NFL protocols for
“Commissioner Discipline,” including process by which players are permitted to
appeal discipline and proceed to arbitration).
206. Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 229 (citing Meredith, 209 F.3d at 403) (noting criteria
under which repudiation exception to exhaustion requirement applies).
207. See id. (concluding NFL had not repudiated agreement with NFLPA/
Elliott and that application of second exception from Rabalais was not warranted).
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cordingly, the majority determined that Elliott was required to exhaust the contractual remedies available to him under the CBA
before filing his claim in district court.208
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Graves made it clear that he
would have reached a different result in the Elliott case.209 Judge
Graves began by criticizing the NFL’s investigation into the domestic abuse allegations against Elliott and its procedures for handling
player appeals of League-imposed discipline.210 The dissent began
by stating:
This is a case about undisclosed information, uninformed
decisions, and an arguably unfair process in determining
whether Dallas Cowboys running back Ezekiel Elliott
should be punished for allegations of domestic violence
made by an accuser who was found not credible by the
NFL’s lead investigator, who was then excluded from
meetings with NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell.211
Next, Judge Graves stated the reason for his dissent: his belief
that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction when it issued
the preliminary injunction against the NFL.212 In support of this
assertion, Judge Graves turned to the LMRA.213 The majority’s outcome was flawed, Judge Graves argued, because the LMRA itself
208. See id. (finding that Elliott had not fully exhausted contractual remedies
available to him under CBA and that, accordingly, he filed his claim prematurely
with district court). For the full holding of the Fifth Circuit majority in the Elliott
case, see supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
209. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 229–236 (5th Cir. 2017) (Graves, J., dissenting)
(“For the reasons stated herein, I conclude that the district court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction.”).
210. See id. at 229–30 (Graves, J., dissenting) (describing NFL’s use of “arguably unfair process” in resolving Elliott’s appeal of Commissioner-imposed
suspension).
211. Id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (criticizing NFL for its handling of Elliott investigation and Elliott’s appeal of suspension imposed on him). For details of
NFL’s investigation into allegations against Elliott, and lead investigator’s findings
that allegations lacked credibility, see supra notes 129–153 and accompanying text.
212. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 231 (Graves, J., dissenting) (“The majority . . .
concludes that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it issued
the preliminary injunction, vacates, and remands with instructions to dismiss. I
disagree and conclude that the district court indeed had subject matter jurisdiction. I agree with the majority that this court reviews questions of subject matter
jurisdiction de novo. But I disagree with the majority’s repeated suggestion that
we are here on the appeal of the district court’s preliminary injunction as opposed
to the NFL’s motion for stay.”).
213. See id. at 231–32 (Graves, J., dissenting) (referencing LMRA as basis for
majority’s conclusion that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue
preliminary injunction against NFL).
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“does not explicitly require exhaustion.”214 The NFL even conceded this point at oral argument, as Judge Graves pointed out.215
Judge Graves asserted that, in order to properly allege breach of the
CBA in its claim on behalf of Elliott, the NFLPA was only required
to satisfy the LMRA’s three elements: “(1) a claim of a violation of
(2) a contract (3) between an employer and a labor organization.”216 The NFLPA did just that, Judge Graves stated, because it
“allege[d] a violation of a contract, the CBA.”217 “The CBA was
entered into by the NFLPA, a labor organization, and the NFL, an
employer.”218
In the absence of an explicit exhaustion requirement in the
LMRA, Judge Graves continued, the majority’s holding would need
to be supported by case-law.219 However, “neither the NFL nor the
majority cite[d] a single case where a court held that the petitioner
failed to exhaust in a situation like [Elliott’s],” Judge Graves
stated.220 “Instead, both cite[d] various cases which are dissimilar
and ignore cases which do not support a conclusion of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”221 To bolster this point, Judge Graves proceeded to address two of the cases on which the majority relied in
forming its opinion: Vaca and Meredith.222
Regarding Vaca, Judge Graves asserted that the case does not
stand for the proposition that it is only the arbitrator’s written
214. See id. at 236 (Graves, J., dissenting) (pointing out that language of
LMRA does not require party to exhaust all contractual remedies available to him
or her prior to filing claim in court). For an explanation of the three elements a
party must satisfy to bring a lawsuit against an employer under the LMRA, see supra
notes 177–178 and accompanying text.
215. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 232 (Graves, J., dissenting) (offering fact that
NFL conceded that LMRA does not explicitly require exhaustion as further support for argument that district court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue preliminary injunction against League).
216. Id. at 232 (Graves, J., dissenting) (quoting Carpenters Local Union 1846
v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 500 (5th Cir. 1982)).
217. Id. (Graves, J., dissenting).
218. Id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (providing facts from case to support assertion
that NFLPA satisfied LMRA’s three elements for suing employer for breach of
contract).
219. See id. at 231–32 (Graves, J., dissenting) (supporting argument on dissent
that exhaustion is not required by LMRA and that majority also lacked supporting
case-law to bolster its finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction).
220. Id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (asserting that majority failed to cite any cases
to support its proposition that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because NFLPA and Elliott failed to satisfy exhaustion requirement).
221. Id. at 232 (Graves, J., dissenting) (noting that cases supported by majority were factually distinct from Elliott case).
222. See id. at 234–35 (Graves, J., dissenting) (addressing prior Fifth Circuit
cases on which majority relied in reaching its conclusion in Elliott II).
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award that constitutes exhaustion and that failure to fully exhaust
places a breach of contract claim outside of judicial review.223 Instead, Judge Graves argued that Vaca only requires the employee to
attempt to exhaust and show that the contractual remedy proved
unsatisfactory, and that Elliott satisfied those requirements.224
Judge Graves then distinguished Meredith, in which the Fifth
Circuit held that a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
absent exhaustion, because the employee had failed to seek arbitration.225 Judge Graves argued that, unlike in Meredith, the NFLPA
and Elliott took the final required step in the CBA’s grievance procedures and attempted arbitration.226
Next, Judge Graves suggested that the majority should have
considered the Fifth Circuit case of Houston Refining, L.P. v. United
Steel227 for the proposition that an alleged violation of a CBA satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of Section 301(a) of the
LMRA.228 Judge Graves noted that the case is binding authority on
the court and shows that “exhaustion is a prudential consideration
and not a strict jurisdictional prerequisite.”229 Contrary to the majority’s assertion that the district court would have only had jurisdiction if the NFLPA had fully exhausted the grievance procedures
available to it under the CBA, Judge Graves argued that the only
prerequisite to district court jurisdiction was an alleged violation of
a CBA.230 Judge Graves stated that an alleged violation of a CBA “is
all that is required to allow the district court to exercise jurisdiction,” and that the NFLPA satisfied this requirement by alleging

223. See id. at 235 (Graves, J., dissenting) (discussing relevance of Vaca to Elliott II case).
224. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Vaca only requires attempt
to exhaust, rather than full exhaustion).
225. See id. (Graves, J. dissenting) (discussing relevance of Meredith to Elliott
case).
226. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (citing Meredith v. La. Fed’n of Teachers,
209 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2000)) (distinguishing Meredith from Elliott case).
227. 765 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that alleged violation of CBA satisfies LMRA’s jurisdictional requirement).
228. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 232 (Graves, J., dissenting) (citing Houston Refining, 765 F.3d at 403).
229. Id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (noting that “the binding authority only requires an attempt,” rather than exhaustion, and, “[t]hus, the NFLPA’s complaint
in district court was not premature”).
230. See id. at 231–32 (Graves, J., dissenting) (presenting counter-argument to
majority’s assertion that district court would have only had jurisdiction if NFLPA
had fully exhausted all grievance procedures available under CBA).
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that the NFL had violated the CBA through its handling of the arbitration proceedings.231
Next, Judge Graves argued that, as conceded by the majority,
the controlling authority recognizes that an employee is only required to “attempt use of the contract grievance procedure.”232
Judge Graves pointed out that in the Elliott case, the NFLPA only
filed a lawsuit after its unsuccessful attempt to use the CBA’s grievance procedures.233
Judge Graves also cited the three exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement that the Fifth Circuit articulated in Rabalais as proof
that full exhaustion is not inevitably required by a court before it
can exercise jurisdiction under Section 301 of the LMRA.234 In addition, Judge Graves stated that the recognized exceptions demonstrate that the “exhaustion requirement is not unlimited,” especially
in cases in which there is reason to doubt “the integrity of the arbitration process.”235 Turning to the second Rabalais exception,
which pertains to repudiation of a CBA, Judge Graves asserted that
application of the exception is warranted when an employer fails to
comply with the terms or procedures of the CBA and thus breaches
the CBA.236 Judge Graves noted that the district court had applied
the second Rabalais exception and concluded that “the NFL had
repudiated the required procedures set forth in the CBA” by failing
to provide Elliott with a fundamentally fair arbitration hearing.237
Judge Graves supported this finding by the district court, citing Article 46 of the CBA, which states that a player is entitled to counsel
and has the right “to attend all hearings provided for in this Article
231. Id. at 232 (Graves, J., dissenting) (suggesting that only prerequisite to
district court jurisdiction was NFLPA’s allegation that NFL had violated CBA).
232. Id. at 233 (Graves, J., dissenting) (quoting Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965)) (providing that LMRA is satisfied when party attempts to use contracted-for grievance procedures).
233. See id. at 234 (Graves, J., dissenting) (supporting argument that NFLPA
satisfied jurisdictional requirement by attempting to use grievance procedure laid
out in CBA with NFL).
234. For a discussion of the three Rabalais exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, as well as the mention of the exceptions in the majority opinion, see
supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
235. Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 233 (5th Cir. 2017) (Graves, J., dissenting) (quoting
Ramirez-Lebron v. Int’l Shipping Agency, Inc., 593 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2010)).
236. See id. at 234 (Graves, J., dissenting) (citing Rabalais v. Dresser Indus.,
566 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1978)). In Rabalais, the Fifth Circuit held that there are
three exceptions to the LMRA’s exhaustion requirement. Rabalais, 566 F.2d at
519.
237. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 234 (Graves, J., dissenting) (noting that district
court had applied second Rabalais exception and found that relief was warranted
for Elliott under that exception).
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and to present, by testimony or otherwise, any evidence relevant to
the hearing.”238 Based on this language from the CBA, Judge
Graves argued that the NFL denied the NFLPA and Elliott a fair
hearing by attempting to keep Roberts from testifying, preventing
the NFLPA and Elliott from accessing Roberts’s notes, and refusing
to allow the NFLPA and Elliott to cross-examine Thompson, Elliott’s accuser.239
Judge Graves concluded by stating that the NFL’s actions in
denying the NFLPA and Elliott the ability to exercise their rights
under Article 46 “impugned the integrity of the arbitration process.”240 Thus, Judge Graves asserted, “the NFL’s refusal to follow
those agreed upon procedures in the CBA resulted in a repudiation
of the grievance procedure sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the district court.”241
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS: HOW THE FIFTH CIRCUIT MAJORITY MAY
HAVE CALLED THE PLAYS INCORRECTLY

Courts afford “substantial deference” to a labor arbitrator’s decision when the arbitrator’s award has been challenged.242 The majority opinion in the Elliott case illustrates this standard of review
and suggests that, when the “substantial deference” standard is applied to lawsuits filed by NFL players against the League, it will be
the NFL that ultimately prevails.243
The holding of the Fifth Circuit majority was consistent with
the holdings of the Eighth and Second Circuits in the Peterson and
Brady cases.244 However, the Fifth Circuit majority’s opinion was
238. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (quoting Art. 46, Section 2(b) of CBA); see
also 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46, § 2(b) (outlining players’ rights in hearing to appeal
arbitration award).
239. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 234 (Graves, J., dissenting) (quoting 2011 NFL
CBA, Art. 46, §§ 2(b), (g)(i)) (providing facts of Elliott case in support of argument that NFL repudiated CBA by denying Elliott fair arbitration hearing, namely
referring to revelation of Roberts’s exclusion from meeting with Goodell and
other investigator and suggesting that Goodell was not fully informed when he
decided to suspend Elliott).
240. Id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (quoting Ramirez-Lebron, 593 F.3d at 132).
241. Id. at 234 (Graves, J., dissenting) (arguing that NFL’s actions constituted
repudiation of CBA, which satisfied second Rabalais exception and granted jurisdiction to district court).
242. For a discussion of the judicial review standard in NFL labor arbitration
cases, see supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text.
243. For the full holding of the Fifth Circuit majority in the Elliott case, see
supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
244. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit’s holding in the Peterson case and
the holding of the Second Circuit in the Brady case, see supra notes 79–91 and
106–115, respectively, and accompanying text.
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arguably flawed in two ways.245 First, the opinion was inconsistent
in how it treated the CBA between the NFL and the NFLPA.246 Second, the majority incorrectly interpreted some of the binding caselaw it relied on in reaching its decision.247
A. The Majority’s Treatment of the CBA
The significance of the CBA in the Elliott case cannot be disputed.248 The CBA laid the groundwork for the case because it allowed the NFL to conduct its investigation into the domestic
violence allegations against Elliott and gave Commissioner Goodell
the authority to suspend Elliott after the investigation.249 The CBA
also outlined the procedure permitting Elliott to appeal the Commissioner’s discipline and commence arbitration.250 Last, and most
importantly for the purpose of this analysis, the CBA influenced the
Fifth Circuit’s analysis once the matter reached court.251 The crucial factor in the majority’s resolution of the case revolved around
whether the NFLPA and Elliott had fulfilled their duties under the
CBA, and the court ultimately found in favor of the NFL based on
its determination that the NFLPA and Elliott had failed to fully exhaust the remedies available to them under the CBA.252 As the majority noted, “the parties contracted to have an arbitrator make a final
decision,” and the NFLPA and Elliott violated that contract by challenging the arbitration process before the final decision had been
made.253 In the majority’s view, because the NFLPA and Elliott had
245. For the holding of the Fifth Circuit majority in the Elliott case, see supra
notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
246. For an analysis of the majority’s treatment of the CBA between the NFL
and NFLPA, see infra notes 248–264 and accompanying text.
247. For a discussion of the majority’s interpretation of certain binding Fifth
Circuit cases, see infra notes 265–292 and accompanying text.
248. For information on the terms of the CBA between the NFL and the
NFLPA, as well as a discussion of the role of the CBA in the Elliott case, see supra
notes 28–41 and accompanying text.
249. For details on the role of the CBA in the resolution of the Elliott case,
see supra notes 28–41 and accompanying text.
250. For a discussion of the pertinence of the CBA between the NFL and
NFLPA in the Fifth Circuit’s resolution of the Elliott case, see supra notes 28–41
and accompanying text; see also 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46 (detailing procedures
through which Commissioner may discipline players, and through which players
may pursue arbitration to appeal Commissioner’s decision).
251. For an analysis of the Fifth Circuit majority’s opinion in the Elliott case,
including its discussion of the CBA between the parties, see supra notes 170–208
and accompanying text.
252. For the Fifth Circuit majority’s holding in the Elliott case, see supra notes
170–172 and accompanying text.
253. Elliott II, 874 F.3d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (emphasizing importance of CBA as binding on parties).
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inexcusably violated the CBA, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the injunction against the NFL, and a reversal in favor of the League was warranted.254
Despite the fact that the majority emphasized the binding nature of the CBA and the importance of the Agreement in deciding
the case, the court reached an outcome that was inconsistent with
that view.255 While it stressed that the NFLPA and Elliott had failed
to fulfill their duties under the CBA, the majority disregarded the
potential contract violations by the NFL.256 As suggested by Judge
Graves in his dissenting opinion, the NFL violated the CBA in its
handling of the arbitration proceedings initiated by Elliott.257 Article 46 of the CBA requires the League to give players the opportunity to “present, by testimony or otherwise, any evidence relevant to
the [arbitration] hearing.”258 Despite this requirement, the NFL
denied the request by the NFLPA and Elliott to present the notes of
Roberts, who led the NFL’s investigation into the allegations against
Elliott, during arbitration.259 The NFL also denied the request by
the NFLPA and Elliott to compel the testimony of Thompson, Elliott’s accuser.260
Both requests were critical to a fair arbitration hearing because
the NFLPA and Elliott learned during arbitration that Commissioner Goodell may have had incomplete information regarding
the results of the Elliott investigation, and because of Thompson’s
credibility when the Commissioner made the decision to suspend
254. For a statement of the Fifth Circuit majority’s holding in the Elliott case,
see supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
255. For the majority’s statement of emphasis regarding the binding nature
of the CBA to which the parties agreed, see supra note 253 and accompanying text.
256. For a review of the majority’s emphasis on the binding nature of the
CBA, see supra note 253 and accompanying text.
257. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 233 (Graves, J., dissenting) (arguing that NFL
repudiated CBA by denying Elliott fair arbitration hearing, namely by excluding
lead investigator from meeting with Goodell, and suggesting that Goodell was not
fully informed when he decided to suspend Elliott).
258. 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46, § 2(b) (stating requirements for arbitration
hearings between NFL player who challenges Commissioner-imposed discipline
and NFL). For the facts of the Elliott case, including the fact that Elliott and the
NFLPA were denied the opportunity to present the notes of the lead investigator
and denied the opportunity to cross-examine Elliott’s accuser during arbitration,
see supra notes 129–169 and accompanying text.
259. For further discussion on the role Roberts played as a lead investigator in
the NFL’s case against Elliott and the discovery that Roberts had been excluded
from meeting with the Commissioner, see supra notes 129–153 and accompanying
text.
260. For information on the request by the NFLPA and Elliott that Thompson be compelled to testify during arbitration, and the arbitrator’s denial of that
request, see supra notes 129–153 and accompanying text.
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Elliott.261 The NFL’s decision to deny these requests casts significant doubt on the fairness of Elliott’s arbitration hearing and supports Judge Graves’s assertion that the League had “impugned the
integrity of the arbitration process.”262 Moreover, the denials arguably should have been construed as violations of the CBA.263
This is particularly true given the majority’s emphasis on the responsibility of each party to fulfill its obligations under the Agreement and the majority’s stringent approach to determining what
constituted fulfillment on the part of the NFLPA and Elliott.264
B. The Majority’s Interpretation of Fifth Circuit Precedent
The Fifth Circuit majority relied on several prior, related cases
as the basis for its decision that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction in the Elliott
case.265 However, the majority incorrectly applied some of these
cases.266 The majority’s interpretation of Meredith v. Louisiana Federation of Teachers exemplifies the first such misapplication of
precedent.267
In Meredith, the Fifth Circuit stated that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide cases alleging violations of a CBA
by an employee against his employer unless the employee has exhausted all contractual procedures available to the employee for
redress.268 The Fifth Circuit majority in the Elliott case cited Meredith in support of its assertion that the LMRA requires exhaustion,
and that the NFLPA and Elliott had failed to fully exhaust the con261. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 233 (Graves, J., dissenting) (arguing that NFL
denied Elliott fair arbitration hearing by excluding lead investigator from meeting
with Goodell, and denying requests of NFLPA and Elliott to present Roberts’s
notes and to cross-examine Elliott’s accuser, Thompson).
262. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (quoting Ramirez-Lebron v. Int’l Shipping
Agency, Inc., 593 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2010)).
263. See 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46, § 2(b) (stating rights of players who proceed
to arbitration to challenge NFL and Commissioner-imposed discipline).
264. For the Fifth Circuit majority’s assertion that the NFLPA and Elliott were
required to fully exhaust the contractual remedies available to them under the
CBA, rather than merely attempt to exhaust them, see supra notes 170–172 and
accompanying text; see also Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 228 (emphasizing importance of
CBA as binding contract for NFLPA and Elliott).
265. For further discussion of the Fifth Circuit majority’s holding in the Elliott case, see supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
266. For the suggestion that the majority opinion may have been flawed in its
interpretation of prior Fifth Circuit cases, see supra notes 265–292 and accompanying text.
267. For a summary of the majority’s treatment of Meredith in its opinion in
the Elliott case, see supra notes 182–196 and accompanying text.
268. For further discussion of the Fifth Circuit majority’s treatment of Meredith, see supra notes 182–196 and accompanying text.
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tractual remedies available to them prior to filing a claim in district
court.269 The NFLPA argued before the Fifth Circuit that Meredith
was no longer good law, following the Supreme Court’s holding in
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.270
In Arbaugh, the Supreme Court suggested that exhaustion
should not be an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.271 The Fifth
Circuit acknowledged Arbaugh but declined to hold that Meredith
was no longer good law.272 However, even if Meredith remains good
law, the majority’s application of Meredith was still flawed.273 As asserted by Judge Graves in his dissenting opinion, Meredith was factually distinguishable from the Elliott case.274 In Meredith, the
employee’s claim failed because the employee had not even sought
to compel arbitration.275 In contrast, the NFLPA and Elliott undisputedly attempted arbitration as required by the CBA in the Elliott
case.276 Thus, the majority should not have relied on Meredith to
support its conclusion that a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in a case where the exhaustion requirement was not
satisfied.277
The Fifth Circuit majority also cited Vaca v. Sipes278 for the proposition that a party’s failure to exhaust the contracted-for reme269. For further discussion of the Fifth Circuit majority’s treatment of Meredith, see supra notes 182–196 and accompanying text.
270. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d 222, 226–27 (5th Cir. 2017) (providing argument
by NFLPA that Meredith is no longer good law, in light of Arbaugh, and that exhaustion should not be considered issue of subject matter jurisdiction for federal
court).
271. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006) (discussing proper
use of term “jurisdiction”).
272. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 227 (discussing Arbaugh and stating: “Given that
Congress has left undisturbed the Supreme Court precedent holding the exhaustion of remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bring an action alleging a breach
of a collective bargaining agreement, the court declines to hold that Meredith is no
longer good law in light of Arbaugh”).
273. For a discussion of the Meredith case and the Fifth Circuit’s application of
it to the Elliott case, see supra notes 182–196 and accompanying text.
274. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 235 (Graves, J., dissenting) (arguing that Meredith
is factually distinguishable from Elliott and that majority opinion consequently
erred in relying so heavily on Meredith).
275. See Meredith v. La. Fed’n of Teachers, 209 F.3d 398, 408 (5th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide case
because exhaustion requirement was not satisfied).
276. For discussion of the facts of the Elliott case, including details of the
arbitration initiated by the NFLPA and Elliott, see supra notes 129–169 and accompanying text.
277. For further discussion of the majority’s conclusion that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction against the
NFL, see supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
278. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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dies available to him or her places the party’s claim for breach of a
CBA beyond “judicial review.”279 However, the Vaca court did not
state that it was only the arbitrator’s written award that constituted
exhaustion.280 Moreover, as asserted by Judge Graves in his dissenting opinion, the court in Vaca may not have intended to require full
exhaustion of a contract’s grievance procedures as a prerequisite
for subject matter jurisdiction in a federal court.281 In Vaca, the
Court cited Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox282 for the principle that
“the employee must at least attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance
and arbitration procedures established by the bargaining agreement.”283 Under this standard, the district court in the Elliott case
would have had subject matter jurisdiction, because the NFLPA and
Elliott made an attempt to exhaust the procedures available to
them under the CBA.284 Thus, Vaca may actually lend more support to the dissent’s argument than to the majority’s opinion.285
In addition, the Fifth Circuit quoted United Paperworkers Int’l
Union v. Misco, Inc. to propose, “where the contract provides grievance and arbitration procedures, those procedures must first be exhausted and courts must order resort to the private settlement
mechanisms without dealing with the merits of the dispute.”286
However, as noted by the dissent, Misco did not involve a breach of

279. Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 226 (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 184–85 (1967))
(“[O]utside of limited circumstances, the failure to ‘fully exhaust [ ]’ contracted
for ‘grievance procedures’ places an employee’s claim for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement beyond ‘judicial review.’ ”).
280. See id. (concluding that Vaca requires exhaustion but does not specifically mention issuance of final award by arbitrator); see also id. at 235 (Graves, J.,
dissenting) (stating “[t]he Vaca Court in no way said that only the arbitrator’s written award constitutes exhaustion and that failure to fully exhaust places a breach
of contract claim outside judicial review”).
281. See id. at 234–35 (Graves, J., dissenting) (asserting that Vaca Court did
not state that it was only arbitrator’s written award that constituted exhaustion and
that failure to fully exhaust placed breach of contract claim outside judicial
review).
282. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
283. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 184–85 (1967) (citing Republic Steel Corp., 379 U.S. at
652).
284. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 234–35 (Graves, J., dissenting) (pointing out that
Elliott and NFLPA attempted to exhaust grievance procedures under League
CBA).
285. See id. (Graves, J., dissenting) (stating that attempt to exhaust was made
in Elliott case and contractual remedy proved unsatisfactory; thus, requirements
under Vaca were met).
286. Id. at 226 (majority opinion) (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union
v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37 (1987)).
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contract or an issue of exhaustion.287 Thus, like Meredith, Misco was
factually distinguishable from the Elliott case.288 Further, as also
noted by Judge Graves in his dissenting opinion, the Misco court
stated that “decisions procured by the parties through fraud or
through the arbitrator’s dishonesty need not be enforced.”289
While the Elliott case did not involve an allegation of fraud, the
soundness of Commissioner Goodell’s decision to suspend Elliott
should be questioned.290 As Judge Graves asserted, given that the
NFLPA and Elliott were not permitted to question Goodell about
the knowledge he had at the time he suspended Elliott, “it is likely
impossible to determine whether information was intentionally
withheld from [the Commissioner] or whether he was provided
false information.”291 Judge Graves suggested that this uncertainty
could satisfy the Misco Court’s standard for arbitration decisions
that need not be enforced.292
VI.

IMPACT: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT MAJORITY’S OPINION BOLSTERED
THE POWER OF THE NFL BUT MAY DRIVE PLAYERS TO
DEMAND CHANGE

Although Elliott lost his legal battle with the NFL, he continues
to enjoy on-field success with the League.293 He still plays running
back for the Dallas Cowboys, and his jersey is one of the most popu287. See id. at 235 (Graves, J., dissenting) (“Misco involved the attempt to set
aside a final arbitration award and did not involve a breach of contract or an alleged issue of exhaustion.”).
288. For the assertion that Meredith was factually distinguishable from the Elliott case, see supra notes 268–277 and accompanying text.
289. Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 235 (Graves, J., dissenting) (quoting United
Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 38).
290. For further discussion of the facts leading up to Commissioner Goodell’s
decision to suspend Elliott from the NFL, see supra notes 129–139 and accompanying text; see also Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 234–35 (Graves, J., dissenting) (addressing
possibility that Goodell was not “fully informed” about results of investigation
before he decided to suspend Elliott).
291. Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 235 (Graves, J., dissenting) (“Here, there is no claim
of fraud, but, without the ability to question Goodell under these circumstances, it
is likely impossible to determine whether information was intentionally withheld
from him or whether he was provided false information.”). For further discussion
of the requests by the NFLPA and Elliott during arbitration to compel Commissioner Goodell to testify, as well as to cross-examine Elliott’s accuser and present
the notes of the lead investigator, see supra notes 144–153 and accompanying text.
292. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 235 (Graves, J., dissenting) (suggesting that facts
of Elliott case could potentially satisfy Misco standard for unenforceable arbitration
awards).
293. See Ezekiel Elliott, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/player/ezekielelliott/
2555224/profile [https://perma.cc/Y7MT-DQPM] (profiling Elliott as member of
Dallas Cowboys).
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lar among football fans.294 This suggests that the case had little effect on Elliott’s career.295 However, the Fifth Circuit’s holding will
have an impact on the relationship between arbitration law and
football.296
The majority’s holding was premised on arbitration law, because it based its holding on the fact that Elliott failed to satisfy the
LMRA’s exhaustion requirement.297 The majority arrived at this
conclusion after it analyzed the LMRA and prior cases in which the
exhaustion requirement was explored in the context of a CBA.298
Notably, the opinion was broad in its scope, because the Fifth Circuit did not confine its holding to the facts of the Elliott case.299
Instead, the court held that a petitioner is required to fully exhaust
all contractual remedies available to him or her prior to filing a
claim against his or her employer in federal court.300 Otherwise, a
federal court will lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
claim.301 The scope of this holding is broad, because prior cases,
including Vaca and Maddox, indicated that a petitioner was only required to attempt to exhaust all available remedies.302
In addition, the Fifth Circuit majority also broadly held that
the second Rabalais exception, providing that exhaustion is not re294. See RJ Ochoa, Ezekiel Elliott and Dak Prescott Are Still Near the Top in NFL
Jersey Sales, BLOGGING THE BOYS, (June 22, 2018, 10:00 AM) https://www.blogging
theboys.com/2018/6/22/17483924/ezekiel-elliott-and-dak-prescott-are-still-nearthe-top-in-nfl-jersey-sales [https://perma.cc/W4CN-ERQU] (stating Elliott’s jersey
is among ten most popular in sales at Dick’s Sporting Goods).
295. See id. (suggesting that Elliott’s popularity among fans remains among
highest in NFL).
296. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit majority’s holding in the Elliott case,
see supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
297. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 235 (reversing district court’s decision in favor of
NFLPA and Elliott, and holding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue preliminary injunction against NFL, because NFLPA and Elliott filed
“premature” claim).
298. For further discussion of the majority’s analysis of the LMRA and prior
Fifth Circuit cases, see supra notes 170–208 and accompanying text.
299. For a summary of the Fifth Circuit majority’s holding, see supra notes
170–172 and accompanying text.
300. For an analysis of the LMRA’s exhaustion requirement in relation to the
facts of the Elliott case, see supra notes 177–208 and accompanying text.
301. For further analysis of whether Elliott satisfied the LMRA’s exhaustion
requirement, see supra notes 177–208 and accompanying text.
302. See Elliott II, 874 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 184–85 (1967)) (“Outside of limited circumstances, the failure to ‘fully
exhaust[ ]’ contracted for ‘grievance procedures’ places an employee’s claim for
breach of a collective bargaining agreement beyond ‘judicial review.’ ”); see also id.
at 226 (Graves, J., dissenting) (quoting Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650, 652 (1965)) (concluding that, under LMRA, employees who bring severance
pay grievances must attempt to use contracted-for grievance procedures).
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quired in the event of an employer’s repudiation of a contract, is
not satisfied when an employer breaches the terms of a CBA.303
The majority articulated this point when it stated that, “[F]or the
repudiation exception to the exhaustion requirements to apply, the
NFL would have had to completely refuse to engage in the process.”304 This component of the majority’s holding adds to its
breadth and potential impact on later cases by raising the standard
for future claimants who wish to use the repudiation exception.305
It also relaxes the burden on employers in such cases by requiring
that they merely demonstrate some effort toward engaging in the
required grievance process.306 The Fifth Circuit’s holding marked
the latest installment in a string of federal appellate-court decisions
that have reversed lower court rulings in favor of NFL players and
reinstated League discipline.307 In this sense, its holding carries
even more of an impact because it illustrates the strong likelihood
of success for the NFL in cases brought by players who seek to challenge League discipline and the fairness of the League’s arbitration
process.308
The majority’s holding in the Elliott case will also impact the
NFL, the NFLPA, and the League’s players.309 The court’s holding
bolstered the broad power that the League already held over the
303. For a discussion of the majority’s application of the second Rabalais exception to the Elliott case, see supra notes 197–208 and accompanying text; see also
Rabalais v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 566 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. 1978) (articulating
exceptions to LMRA’s exhaustion requirement).
304. Elliott II, 874 F.3d at 229 (citing Meredith v. La. Fed’n of Teachers, 209
F.3d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 2000)) (holding that repudiation exception to LMRA’s
exhaustion requirement only applies when employer completely fails to engage in
contracted-for grievance procedures).
305. For a summary of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in the Elliott case, see supra
notes 170–172 and accompanying text; see also Rabalais, 566 F.2d at 519 (articulating exceptions to LMRA’s exhaustion requirement).
306. For the majority’s assertion that application of the repudiation exception
is only warranted where an employer completely fails to engage in a contracted-for
grievance procedure, see supra notes 303–304 and accompanying text.
307. For the holding of the Fifth Circuit majority in the Elliott case, see supra
notes 170–172 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the significance
of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in the Elliott case in the context of the prior holdings
by the Second and Eighth Circuits in the Brady and Peterson cases, see supra notes
11–13 and accompanying text.
308. For a discussion of whether the holdings of the Second and Eighth Circuits were isolated incidents or part of a pattern of cases in which federal appellate
courts have reversed district court holdings and found in favor of the NFL, see
supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
309. For a summary of the Fifth Circuit majority’s holding in the Elliott case,
see supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
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process for dispute resolution with players.310 As previously stated,
the League’s dispute resolution system allows the Commissioner to
unilaterally select the arbitrator and allows the NFL to choose the
forum in which the results of the arbitration process are subject to
appeal.311 The rights of NFL players are thus extraordinarily limited within the League’s internal dispute resolution system.312 The
system leaves a player with almost no option for relief other than
court, but the Fifth Circuit’s holding in the Elliott case signals that
the courtroom is not necessarily the best place for players to take
refuge.313
Under the current CBA between the NFL and the NFLPA, the
players are essentially powerless to overcome the unfairness of the
League’s dispute resolution process.314 However, the current CBA
expires in 2021.315 Decisions like the Fifth Circuit’s holding in the
Elliott case may prompt players to negotiate a more favorable internal dispute resolution process.316 In particular, NFL players may be
310. See 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46 (detailing procedures through which Commissioners may investigate player conduct and impose discipline, as well as
through which players may pursue arbitration, stating that Commissioner has authority to select arbitrator or to serve as arbitrator).
311. See id. (detailing broad authority of Commissioner over player-appeal
process). For a discussion of the terms of the CBA and the ways in which they
favor the NFL, see supra notes 28–41 and accompanying text.
312. See Marc Edelman, Ezekiel Elliott Decision Adds to Commissioner’s Power, but
NFL Players Need Checks and Balances, FORBES (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2017/10/13/ezekiel-elliott-decision-adds-tocommissioners-power-but-nfl-players-need-checks-and-balances/#564eb8ea49c9
[https://perma.cc/S2YT-78UA] (“With an internal dispute resolution system that
allows the commissioner to control the internal arbiter of such a matter and then
allows the NFL to choose the forum, if any, in which the process is subject to
appeal, NFL players’ rights become extraordinarily limited.”).
313. For the holding of the Fifth Circuit majority in the Elliott case, see supra
notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
314. See 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46 (detailing procedures through which Commissioners may investigate player conduct, impose discipline, and through which
players may pursue arbitration, stating that Commissioner has authority to select
arbitrator or to serve as arbitrator). For further discussion detailing the procedures through which the Commissioners may investigate player conduct, impose
discipline, and through which players may pursue arbitration, see supra note 310
and accompanying text.
315. See Bonesteel, supra note 19 (stating that current CBA between NFL and
NFLPA expires in 2021); see also Ryan Wilson, NFLPA Issues Statement in Response to
NFL’s New National Anthem Policy, CBS SPORTS, (May 23, 2018) https://www.cbs
sports.com/nfl/news/nflpa-issues-statement-in-response-to-nfls-new-national-anthem-policy/ [https://perma.cc/MUQ2-HAQ6] (noting NFL has announced new
policy requiring players to stand during national anthem, and stating that NFLPA
will ensure new policy does not violate players’ rights under current CBA).
316. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit majority’s holding in the Elliott case,
see supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text; see also Marc Edelman, Ezekiel Elliott Decision Adds To Commissioner’s Power, But NFL Players Need Checks And Balances,
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inclined to write specific arbitration-related protections into the
next CBA for themselves, because courts have shown an unwillingness to stray from the terms of the agreement.317 NFL players could
draw inspiration from the CBAs of other professional sports
leagues, including the NBA, NHL, and MLB.318 The other leagues’
CBAs are particularly instructive in how to limit the power of their
respective Commissioners.319 The Commissioners of the NBA,
NHL, and MLB have the power to review and discipline players;
however, Commissioner Goodell’s authority is much broader.320 In
the MLB, for example, “appeals of discipline . . . go to either a
neutral arbitrator or a tripartite arbitration review panel.”321 As discussed in this Casenote, if an NFL player appeals his discipline,
Commissioner Goodell can choose to serve as the arbitrator.322
NFL players could advocate for an arbitration model in which their
appeals would be heard by a “neutral arbitrator,” rather than the
Commissioner himself.323 Thus, it is possible that the holding of
the Fifth Circuit majority in the Elliott case, while unfavorable to
the NFLPA and Elliott, could ultimately benefit League players by

FORBES (Oct. 13, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/
2017/10/13/ezekiel-elliott-decision-adds-to-commissioners-power-but-nfl-playersneed-checks-and-balances/#564eb8ea49c9 [https://perma.cc/8SKX-3TC6] (“Perhaps when the current NFL collective bargaining agreement expires, the NFL players will either negotiate a better process for arbitrating their disputes with the
league or, even more drastically, decertify their union and challenge league-wide
discipline under principles of antitrust law.”).
317. For a discussion of the holding of the Fifth Circuit majority in the Elliott
case, see supra notes 170–172. For the pro-NFL holdings of the Eighth and Second
Circuits in the Peterson and Brady cases, see supra notes 79–91, 106–115 and accompanying text.
318. See Adriano Pacifici, Scope and Authority of Sports League Commissioner Disciplinary Power: Bounty and Beyond, 3 BERKELEY J. OF ENT. & SPORTS L. 93, 105 (Apr.
2014) (comparing NFL’s CBA to CBAs of NBA, NHL, and MLB).
319. See id. (discussing aspects of CBAs of other leagues that would potentially
benefit NFL).
320. See id. (“The NFL system is clearly the worst system of the four. It provides no independent review and grants Commissioner Goodell near unlimited
power.”).
321. Id. (highlighting benefits of MLB’s CBA and its neutral arbitration
protocol).
322. See 2011 NFL CBA, Art. 46 (stating that Commissioner or his designee
are entitled to serve as hearing officers in arbitration).
323. See Pacifici, supra note 319, at 105 (comparing NFL’s CBA to CBAs of
NBA, NHL, and MLB).
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prompting them to advocate for fairer dispute resolution
processes.324
Kara Crawford*
324. For further discussion of Fifth Circuit majority’s holding in the Elliott
case, see supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A., University of Maryland, 2010. I dedicate this article to my parents, Joseph and Patricia, and to Colin, Patrice, Aunt Cathy, Doug and Rory for supporting and encouraging me.
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